Pakistan Won Aerial Warfare in the 1965 War

By Sajjad Shaukat

Pakistan is celebrating golden jubilee of the 1965 war which India imposed on September 6, but the latter was defeated by Pakistan’s Armed Forces. On September 7, Air Force Day (Yum-e-Fizaiya) is being celebrated by every Pakistani in the memory of the martyrs and heroes of that war, and to pay tribute to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) which won aerial warfare by defeating India.

On September 6, 1965 when India suddenly attacked Pakistan, its forces crossed the international border and the BRB canal, and captured a town of Batapore, Lahore, (Lahore-Burki sector) the same day; a counter offensive of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point.

Similarly, when Indian forces launched an offensive towards Sialkot, aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force supported the Pakistan Army, and Indian forces were compelled to retreat. Besides, aircraft and valiant personnel of the PAF supported the ground forces in the sectors like Rajastan (Sindh), Khem Karan (Punjab) and Chumb (Kashmir) including other ones.

Despite Indian surprise invasion in 1965, while displaying valour, and without bothering for their lives, the pilots of the PAF castigated the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the aerial warfare. In this regard, Squadron Leader M. M. Alam set new records in history of air warfare on 7th September by defending Pakistan’s airspace against the aggressors, and shot down five Indian aircraft in less than sixty seconds at Sargodha. He is rightly branded as a “hunter of the hunters”. 

And Flight Lieutenant Yunus Hussain fought in air battles aggressively and fearlessly. During one such engagement, he fought singly against 6 enemy aircraft and shot down 2 Hunters. Though his own aircraft was damaged in this encounter, he managed to bring it back to base safely. On 6 September, while attacking Halwara airfield, his small formation was intercepted by a large number of enemy and, although his aircraft was hit, he refused to break off the engagement, in complete disregard of personal safety, and was reported missing from this mission. While Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmad Rafiqui led a formation of 3 F-86 aircraft on a strike against Halwara airfield, the formation was intercepted by about 10 Hunter aircraft out of which Squadron Leader Rafiqui accounted for one. But, then his guns jammed due to a defect. However, Rafiqui refused to leave the battle area instead he ordered his No. 2 to continue the engagement, while his end was never in doubt, but, he chose to disregard it and, his aircraft was shot down and he was martyred.

As regards the victory of PAF, a writer of the Pakistan Air Force elaborates, “To achieve this, PAF adopted an aggressive and courageous approach, which ultimately provided an impregnable shield to the country’s airspace. This was also attributable to the leadership of Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Asghar Khan and dynamic leadership of Air Marshal Nur Khan—said on 4th September that superiority in numbers does not decide air battles; better training, morale, and above all fighting spirit in fact are the deciding factors—what many don’t know is that it was the PAF who played a major role in denying General Chaudhry of Indian Army his cocktail party at Gymkhana Lahore. PAF air support at this crucial juncture turned the tables on the enemy—
at this crucial juncture, appeared 06 PAF Sabres led by SQN LDR Sajjad “Nosey” Haider and wrought havoc with the enemy armor and infantry trying to cross the BRB Canal-- air support continued as 18 more F-86 Sabres kept pounding guns, tanks which were trying to advance towards Lahore, Jassar and Kasur. PAF was instrumental in saving Lahore.”

However, Pakistan Air Force made it possible for the ground troops to recapture the territories from India, and also to take from Indian forces various regions like Khem Karan Rajastan, Chumb etc.

It is notable that the marvelous performance of PAF was substantiated by a letter sent by President of Pakistan to Air Marshal Nur Khan, complimenting the PAF on its first two days of full-scale operations. Subsequently, PAF remained in virtual control in vital battle areas as the IAF, after 7th September, showed growing reluctance to engage an aerial combat. This record-breaking role of PAF is primarily attributable to salient aspects of leadership and brevity.

The employment of the bomber fleet was also very well-panned by the PAF top leadership. Besides the fighters, the bombers also made significant contributions by undertaking regular night bombing operations against a number of Indian airfields, damaging most of them. The brilliantly-flown PAF Sabers inflicted more losses on the IAF Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres.

PAF also exhibited a classic example of unconventional mans utilizing its C-130 fleet for night bombing. The speed with which the idea was adopted and the necessary modifications incorporated reflected the PAF’s pilots and engineer’s genius for improvisation.
The 1965 war saw the best of the PAF’s war-fighting abilities, and made history by shooting down 13 aircraft in one day. PAF emerged as glorious because of a very high standard of its leadership and a determination, springing from the realization that national survival was at stake.

During that war of 1965, PAF had destroyed 104 Indian aircraft on ground and in the air, while damaged more than 10—not counting the losses, inflicted by PAF’s night bombing on the India airfields and bases and other military installations.

It is mentionable that some opine that India and Pakistan have made contradictory claims of victory during the aerial warfare of the 1965 war. But facts cannot be denied, which prove that PAF won this war.

In this respect, while realizing Indian failures, Indian Air Chief Marshal (R) P.C. Lal who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the Indo-Pak war of 1965, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army.

While, in his book, titled “The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle: The First Indo-Pak Air War”, which is being released on September 1, this year, ex-Indian Air Marshal Bharat Kumar admitted the Indian defeat in the war of 1965, as disclosed by The Times of India.  

He reveals, “It was the first air battle between India and Pakistan. The Indian Air Force was numerically superior, with 28 combat squadrons to PAF’s 11, but it was saddled with technologically inferior fighters. IAF’s latest history of its operations in the 1965 war acknowledges it suffered disproportionately higher losses than PAF. But, it says the force showed resilience and determination to set aside initial losses and gradually turn the tables on its adversary with effective counter-strikes to prosecute the war till the ceasefire came into effect on September 22”.

The book indicates, “There is no doubt that Indian losses in aircraft were higher” than those of Pakistan—tried to use just this figure alone to proclaim its victory”.

Undoubtedly, in aerial warfare between IAFF and PAF, the latter emerged as victorious in the I965 war. Pakistan Air Force gained a lot of credibility among Pakistan military and international war writers for successful defence of Lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India. Thought-out the war, PAF not only maintained its air superiority, but also remained vigilant in informing armed forces and general masses regarding the air attacks of Indian fighters.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

50th Anniversary of the 1965 War

By Sajjad Shaukat

Although every year September 6 is celebrated as the defence day to pay tribute to the Pakistani soldiers who defeated India in the 1965 war, yet this very day has come at a time when BJP-led government of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has planned to celebrate the golden jubilee of that Indo-Pak war, which New Delhi had never celebrated in the past. In order to propagate that war of 1965 was won by them, they have decided to celebrate September as a victory month. They have started preparing campaigns for print and electronic media besides other social events, depicting the war to have been a “one sided” affair.

While, in his book, titled “The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle: The First Indo-Pak Air War”, which is being released on September 1, this year, ex-Indian Air Marshal Bharat Kumar admitted the Indian defeat in the war of 1965, as disclosed by The Times of India.  

However, on the 6th of September in 1965, India crossed the international border, on the western front marking an official beginning of the war. An attempt to cross the BRB canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, Lahore. Besides the Kashmir and other sectors, similarly, Indian forces launched an offensive towards Sialkot. Pakistan found itself with an extremely challenging situation, as India suddenly attacked, while Pakistan’s Armed Forces were not exactly expecting.

But, Pakistan’s Armed Forces rose to the occasion, and in Lahore, they held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians. One unit of the Indian Regiment had also crossed the BRB canal and captured the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. In this regard, the huge credit goes to the all men of Pak Army, who were deployed in the Lahore areas of Wahgah, Burki etc. Among them, Major Raja Aziz Bhatti played a huge role in the outcome of the Lahore battles and was martyred (Shaheed).  

As regards Sialkot, the aim of the Indian attack was to seize the key Grand Trunk Road around Waziristan and the capture of Jassoran which would enable domination of Sialkot-Pasrur railway, thus completely cutting off Pakistani supply line. The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II, and was fought at Chawinda in Sialkot sector—The Battle of Chawinda resulted into victory of Pakistan whose armoured forces destroyed 120 tanks of India.

Regarding aerial warfare between Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), the latter emerged as victorious in the I965 war. Pakistan Air Force gained a lot of credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and international war writers for successful defence of Lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India.

During that war, PAF had destroyed 100 Indian aircraft on ground and in the air, while damaged more than 10—not counting the undermined losses inflicted by PAF’s night bombing.

It is notable that the then Squadron Leader  M. M. Alam rewrote the history of air warfare on 7th September by setting new records, while defending Pakistan’s Airspace against the aggressors, and shot down five Indian aircraft in less than sixty seconds at Sargodha. He can genuinely be branded as a “hunter of the hunters”. 

The role of Pakistan Navy in the Indo-Pak war of 1965 is also appreciable. Securing Pakistan’s coasts, it played a vital role in defeating India. In 1965, the Operation Dawarka marked the first use of the Pakistan Navy in the war. The naval attack was launched by Pakistan on September 7, 1965 on Western Indian shores. The town of Dwarka was chosen to be a target of the attack, because it has historical relevance for Pakistan. The Pakistani operation was successful and its warships harboured in Bombay, making the Indian Navy unable to sortie. In this context, Ghazi, the only submarine in the conflict arena was deployed to attack heavy ships of the Indian Navy, and the ships, aiding Operation Dwarka. It won 10 awards including two decorations of Sitara-e-Juratand the President’s citations. The commanding officer Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi operated the submarine in the enemy territorial waters with strong determination.

Besides, Pakistan Army launched a number of successful covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases and military installations. On September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields. The commando mission affected some planned Indian operations.

Nevertheless, despite Indian surprise invasion in 1965, while showing courage, and by sacrificing their lives, the Pakistani forces’ counterattack not only recaptured the territories from India, but also took Khem Karan from Indian forces including various regions of Rajastan, Sindh, and Chumb sector in Kashmir.

It is mentionable that during the war, the whole nation showed solidarity with Pakistan’s Armed Forces and the air of the country was full of radio waves, carrying national anthems and patriotic songs, especially in Noor jehan’s voice which prompted every soldier to fight harder. There were a lot of national heroes like Brigadier Ahsan Rashid, Major Raja Aziz Bhatti, SQN LDR M. M. Alam, SQN LDR Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui etc.,  most recognized, many unsung, we remember them always and particularly in this September, marking the defense day.

Now-a-days, it is a convention for military fans in India and Pakistan to talk about the war of 1965. According to many sources, Pakistan won that war, while Indians claim that they won the war. But, besides the already mentioned admission by Indian Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, there is other evidence of Pakistan’s victory.

In fact, when Indians were at the edge of loss, some of their officials went to the USA and requested for ceasefire. It is quite clear that India first thought about ceasefire because they did not want further loss. However, the war between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared following diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and USA and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.

India’s Prime Minister Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire because he was not able to bear Indian further losses.

It is noteworthy that The “Official History of the 1965 War, “drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India 1992 was a long suppressed document which revealed Indian miscalculations. According to it, on 22 September when the Security Council Security was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri, if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses.

And Indian top military officials realized that Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

Air Chief Marshal (R) P.C. Lal who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army.

These statements and ground realities prove that there is no doubt that Pakistan won the war of 1965 by defeating India.

Undoubtedly, despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of India, it was due to the spirit of sacrificing their own lives, motivated by Pak Army’s Motto–Iman, Taqwa, Jihad and Fi Sabilillah that Pakistan’s Armed Forces fought bravely and courageously. In this context, in his historical address, the then President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan gave reference of Kalama-e-Tayyaba.  

Nonetheless, on the 50th anniversary of the 1965 war, Pakistanis pay tribute to every Shaheed and Ghazi whom they salute to symbolize country’s love for those men in uniform, as they would live alive due to their deeds.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Double diplomatic collapse

Pakistan’s diplomatic initiatives with Afghanistan and India have both collapsed.

Afghanistan’s President Ghani and Pakistan’s prime minister and army chief were sincere in desiring normalisation. The implicit bargain was that Pakistan would deliver the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table while Afghanistan would act against Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders and militants hiding in Afghan territory. Success would have implied: enhanced security within Pakistan from TTP-engineered terrorism and attacks by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and an end to Indian pressure on Pakistan on the western front; the re-emergence of the Afghan Taliban as a political force in Kabul; and the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.

It was evident from the outset that India and hostile elements in Afghanistan would work overtime to subvert this peace initiative. They appear to have succeeded.

The debacle on the west is intimately related to the disturbing developments in the east.

The Islamabad-Kabul understanding was based on over-optimistic expectations on both sides. Ghani’s ability to act against the TTP and the BLA was constrained by his lack of control of the Afghan security establishment, especially the National Directorate of Security (NDS) — Afghanistan’s intelligence agency — led by a Karzai holdover. Kabul proved unable (or unwilling) to kill, capture or expel Mullah Fazlullah and other TTP elements holed up in Afghanistan.

Similarly, Pakistan promised too much in offering to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. To do so, Islamabad was obliged to revive or reveal its contacts with them. If the Kabul-Taliban talks had succeeded, few would have objected to the presence of Afghan Taliban leaders in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the revelation of Mullah Omar’s demise by the NDS upended the talks. (Pakistan’s failure was in either not knowing of Mullah Omar’s death or not preventing the NDS from gaining knowledge of this while senior Taliban commanders remained unaware.)

As no doubt anticipated by the NDS and its Indian patrons, a leadership struggle ensued between the ‘fight’ and the ‘fight and talk’ factions within the Taliban. To salvage the talks, Pakistan’s agencies attempted to hastily gather the Taliban leaders to select Omar’s deputy as the new Amirul Momineen, further exposing the relationship. But the Taliban’s fighting faction, freed of Mullah Omar’s ghost edicts supporting talks, and fearful of losing ground to the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ (IS), escalated its attacks within Afghanistan, particularly against targets in Kabul.

Under pressure to avoid blame for the security failures in Kabul, and aware that Islamabad was no longer able to deliver the Taliban to the negotiating table, President Ghani took the easy route of placing all the blame on Pakistan. His Aug 10 statement was indistinguishable from Karzai’s familiar diatribes against Pakistan. Chief Executive Abdullah and other factions joined him in whipping up the anti-Pakistan animus. The ‘gathering’ of Taliban leaders to choose Mullah Mansour as Omar’s successor was used as a basis to extrapolate that Pakistan maintained Taliban sanctuaries and bomb-making factories, and connived in the Taliban attacks. Ghani declared that he did not want Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the table but to “prosecute” them.

Kabul was the scene of orchestrated demonstrations against Pakistan, the burning of Pakistan’s national flag, calls for boycott of trade with and even ‘jihad’ against Pakistan. A demand was made that an Afghan delegation be immediately received by Pakistan’s prime minister and army chief.

Instead of protesting Kabul’s unsubstantiated charges and demanding an apology for the desecration of Pakistan’s national flag, Pakistan’s leadership meekly received the angry Afghan delegation to clear the “misunderstanding” ( to quote Sartaj Aziz).

Pakistan will be able to evoke respect for its national interests only if it respects its own dignity and honour. Pakistan should demand an apology from Kabul for the desecration of its national flag and a retraction of the wild accusations voiced by Ghani and other Afghan leaders. If they desire a trade boycott, Pakistan should fulfil their wish and halt all trans-shipment and transit until they reverse their hostility.

At the strategic level too, there is need for a careful policy review to deal with an Afghanistan that is likely to be embroiled in chaos and conflict for some time. Pakistan should: first, secure its border against TTP and BLA infiltration from Afghan territory; second, devise strategies to eliminate their safe havens in Afghanistan; third, promote coherence among the Afghan Taliban; and, fourth, work with China, Russia, the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume the Kabul-Taliban talks and insulate Afghanistan from infiltration by the IS.

The debacle on the west is intimately related to the disturbing developments in the east. Apart from working to scuttle a Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement, India has rejected Pakistan’s endeavours to resume the ‘composite dialogue’ and exerted direct pressure on Pakistan to keep it on the diplomatic and military defensive — thus the Line of Control (LoC) violations, threatening statements and the hostile media and diplomatic campaigns.

Instead of a muscular response, Pakistan has virtually endorsed the Indian premises for normalisation in the Ufa statement by restricting the Pakistan-India talks to terrorism, evoking public denunciation within the country and disappointment from Kashmiri leaders.

The Gurdaspur incident, on the eve of the scheduled terrorism talks, is no accident. Indian agencies are past masters at stage-managing such events to suit their purpose. The Indian media has been unleashed to pin blame for this incident also on Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan’s national security adviser plans to walk blithely into this Indian entrapment in New Delhi next week.

The right response would be to: call off this ill-conceived exchange; respond effectively to the Indian media onslaught by projecting India’s support for the TTP and BLA and its historic role as a state sponsor of terrorism; protest formally to the UNMOGIP and the Security Council about India’s LoC violations; and raise India’s human rights violations in occupied Kashmir at the Human Rights Council and other international forums.

Instead of submitting to Modi’s agenda, Pakistan should remind the world that: Kashmir remains a nuclear flashpoint and must be addressed, bilaterally or multilaterally; that India’s arms build-up will oblige Pakistan to respond appropriately; and that the danger of a disastrous conflict can be avoided only through a comprehensive dialogue encompassing Kashmir and reciprocal arms control between Pakistan and India.

Losing the narrative

By Munir Akram

In a review of Anatol Lieven’s book Pakistan: A Hard Country, in the Guardian of May 1, 2011, Pankaj Mishra wrote:

“[…] [A]n un-blinkered vision of South Asia would feature a country whose fanatically ideological government in 1998 conducted nuclear tests, threatened its neighbour with all-out war and, four years later, presided over the massacre of 2,000 members of a religious minority. Long embattled against secessionist insurgencies […], the ‘flailing’ state […] now struggles to contain a militant movement in its heartland. It is also where thousands of women are killed every year for failing to bring sufficient dowry and nearly 200,000 farmers have committed suicide in the past decade.” Mishra added: “This country is not Pakistan; it is India.”

The review noted that India has revamped its Western image in a most successful rebranding and through one of “the cleverest PR campaigns.” On the other hand, Pakistan (which both Lieven and Christophe Jaffrelot, in his book The Pakistan Paradox, describe as a country with a surprisingly resilient society and institutions, despite a history of mis-governance) seems to have “lost the narrative”.

The joint statement issued in Ufa is the clearest and most recent confirmation of this unfortunate reality.

Normalisation between Pakistan and India is an imperative. But this can be achieved only if Pakistan pursues an equal relationship with clarity, confidence and persistence.

Normalisation between Pakistan and India can be achieved only if Pakistan pursues an equal relationship.

In recent interactions with India, Pakistan’s political leaders have displayed none of these attributes. They are being played like a fiddle by Modi.

Below are the essential aims Pakistan needs to project and promote vis-à-vis India.

Military balance:

India’s current military build-up poses an ever growing threat to Pakistan’s security and needs to be neutralised, either through arms control or a reciprocal defensive build-up.

To those, like the US, who argue that this is not aimed against Pakistan, it should be sufficient to point out that almost all of India’s capabilities are deployed against Pakistan; its military doctrines are Pakistan-specific; and threats of aggression against Pakistan are persistent and current.

Pakistan should propose bold and specific arms-control measures to India, bilaterally and through multilateral channels. The onus for refusal should rest on New Delhi. Simultaneously, Pakistan cannot be deterred by Western admonishments from taking measures, including short- and long-range missiles, to deter Indian aggression or adventurism.

Kashmir:

Kashmir remains a flashpoint for another Pakistan-India conflict. It cannot be put on a back channel. The ongoing exchanges along the Line of Control can easily escalate. Modi’s policies virtually ensure that, sooner rather than later, there will be another Kashmiri revolt. Islamabad would not be able to restrain support flowing to a new Kashmiri insurgency even if it wanted to. It is for New Delhi to halt its repression and human rights abuses, de-militarise Kashmir and engage in a constructive dialogue with Pakistan. This can avert a Kashmiri eruption and a Pakistan-India crisis.

Terrorism:

Pakistan is the major victim of terrorism in South Asia, with by some accounts 50,000 casualties since the US-led incursion into Afghanistan. Much of this terrorism has been sponsored or supported by India, as admitted recently by BJP leaders. India should not be allowed to adopt the victim’s mantle.

In Ufa, Pakistan should have insisted on reflecting Indian support to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), insisted on an inquiry into the Samjhauta Express incident, and clarified that the legitimate Kashmiri struggle for self-determination does not amount to terrorism.

Trade and investment:

Trade with India can be mutually beneficial, especially in the exchange of natural resources and food, gas and energy supplies (from Iran and Central Asia). In manufactures, India competes with Pakistan and enjoys the advantage of size and a host of protections.

Similarly, the Indian investment regime is far more restrictive than that of Pakistan. The field has to be levelled before bilateral trade and investment can be fully opened.

Transit:

Transit through Pakistan to central and west Asia is a major Indian priority (although it is building an alternate route from Chabahar in Iran). Pakistan cannot provide such transit to India until the issue of Indian subversion through the BLA and the TTP has been resolved. Even after that, Pakistan should pose two conditions: one, that the upgradation of transit facilities involved should be financed by India or the regional countries involved (as China is doing on the Economic Corridor); and, two, that Pakistan should be accorded reciprocal rights for transit to Nepal and Bangladesh through India.

Water:

Access to water is fast emerging as an existential issue for Pakistan (and for India). To avoid food and ecological disasters, and a possible conflict, it has become vital for the two countries to live up to the principle of the equitable sharing of water enshrined in the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan must secure this aim bilaterally and through all available international avenues.

Composite agenda:

It is self-evident that all the issues between Pakistan and India are interlinked and interdependent. Progress on some will facilitate movement on others; and vice versa. The security issue and Kashmir were rightly accorded higher priority when the agenda for the composite dialogue was framed. The rationale for this priority is, if anything, more compelling today. It is purblind to restrict attention to terrorism only.

Foreign policy management:

The foreign policy lapse reflected in the Ufa statement is, unfortunately, not an isolated incident. There have been several other demonstrations of a naïve and simplistic approach to foreign affairs.

As has been noted in the Pakistani media, it reflects a dysfunction. The current complex structure at the apex of the foreign ministry is no doubt a major problem. An even larger problem is the inability of the professional foreign service to render good advice to the political leadership and/or the unwillingness of the leadership to accept it.

It is imperative to ‘normalise’ the structure, restore the primacy of the professional foreign service, integrate the security establishment into policymaking and appoint someone with the experience and independence required to formulate and project a foreign policy that reflects Pakistan’s vital interests and objectives and preserves its dignity.

Back to the Future

By Munir Akram

PAKISTAN’S relations with India have returned to familiar hostility. The foreseeable future looks much the same. Normalising relations with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP government was never a likely prospect. The contrary anticipation in Islamabad was naive and delusional. Modi’s policies are driven by an ideology whose central tenet is the ‘Hinduisation’ of ‘Mother India’ which encompasses all of South Asia.

Pakistan’s eagerness to normalise relations with Modi’s India — attending his ‘inauguration’, pleading for revival of the ‘Composite Dialogue’, offering concessions on trade — were seen as signs of weakness and evidence of the differences between Pakistan’s civilian government and its ‘security establishment’. Not surprisingly, these overtures were met by intensified bullying and bluster from New Delhi.

Surprisingly, Islamabad suffered Indian insults — cancellation of the foreign secretary talks, unacceptable preconditions for restarting the Composite Dialogue, outrageous threats — in virtual silence. To add injury to insult, it accepted the skewed statement in Ufa restricting dialogue to terrorism.

India’s Western patrons point fingers at Pakistan’s defensive responses rather than the Indian military expansion.

When, in response to a domestic outcry, Pakistan’s government attempted to broaden the agenda of the planned talks between the national security advisers of the two countries, and to revive the tradition of meeting Kashmiri leaders, India issued an ultimatum opposing this, providing Islamabad a convenient excuse to cancel the ill-conceived meeting.

What will follow is a repetition of history: recrimination, rhetoric and rising tensions, manifested in at least four areas.

First: the military threat. Almost all of India’s existing and new military capabilities are being deployed against Pakistan. Doctrines of a ‘limited war’ and a ‘Cold Start’ (surprise) attack have been espoused by India’s military forces. To display his muscle, Modi may feel tempted at some point to test Pakistan’s mettle. The recent LoC violations may be an early test.

Pakistan is obliged to equip itself to deter and defend against such adventurism: modern tanks and aircraft are required to deter and defend against a conventional attack; short-range missiles to break up attacking Indian formations; long-range missiles to neutralise distant missile attack; a second strike capability to deter a pre-emptive strike.

Perversely, India’s Western patrons point fingers at Pakistan’s defensive responses rather than the Indian military expansion, which they myopically see as a counter to China’s rising power. Pakistan should demand that India’s major arms suppliers — the US, Israel and France — cease and desist, lest they destabilise deterrence and encourage another India-Pakistan war. Such a démarche can be accompanied by bold proposals for conventional and nuclear arms control, placing the onus for their rejection on India. 

Second: Kashmir. The Modi-BJP government policy is to eventually change the demographic and political status of India-held Kashmir. Partici­pation in the Srinagar coalition with Kashmiri collaborationists is a first step to this end. An attempt at trifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir is a likely next step.

Inevitably, these BJP moves will be met by strong resistance from the majority of Kashmiri Muslims and start another ‘intifada’. Equally inevitably, India would blame Pakistan for the insurrection, instigating a political and military crisis.

Pakistan should acknowledge that no compromise on Kashmir is possible with India at present. The possibility of a viable future settlement should not be eroded by offering pre-emptive concessions, merely to appear ‘reasonable’. The best defence is offence. Pakistan should revive the demand for implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir; raise India’s oppression of the Kashmiris in the Human Rights Council; call for the withdrawal of India’s 700,000 occupying force from India-held Kashmir; provide generous financial support to Kashmiri political parties seeking self-determination; invite them to meet in Pakistan or elsewhere and help to unify their struggle for freedom.

Third: Afghanistan. It must be anticipated that in the wake of the collapse of the Kabul-Taliban talks, India will intensify its campaign of destabilisation through enhanced support for the TTP and the Baloch insurgency from Afghanistan. Despite the recent rhetoric from President Ghani, Pakistan’s primary effort should be to help in promoting reconciliation in Afghanistan in exchange for Kabul’s action to neutralise the TTP and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). With appropriate incentives and pressure, the Afghan Taliban, under Mullah Mansour, can be persuaded to resume the talks with Kabul and perhaps to agree to a partial de-escalation of violence. However, Pakistan may have to consider unilateral action to root out the TTP from its safe havens in Afghanistan if Kabul and its allies prove unable or unwilling to do so. Such direct action is authorised under several resolutions of the Security Council.

Fourth: the media and diplomatic ‘war’. With active support from the Western media and think tanks, India has been hugely successful in portraying Pakistan as a failing state and the source of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. India’s monumental shortcomings and dysfunctionality remain well-hidden. New Delhi will no doubt now intensify this campaign to ‘isolate’ Pakistan.

Pakistan needs to activate its diplomatic and media machinery to counter this Indian campaign and regain the narrative. A viable way has to be found to conform with international legality regarding the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It will not be difficult to justify contacts with the Afghan Taliban if Pakistan is successful in securing resumption of the talks with Kabul.

These defensive steps should be accompanied by a campaign of offence. Apart from the actions suggested here on arms control and Kashmir, a systematic effort is required to expose India’s historical and current role as a state sponsor of terrorism. As a first step, the three dossiers prepared for the aborted NSA talks on India’s support for the TTP and BLA should be made public and circulated as official documents at the UN. Also, the scope and success of Pakistan’s anti-terrorist operation, Zarb-i-Azb, and NAP need to be more extensively projected to the world community and media.

Only once India realises that it cannot intimidate Pakistan into submission will it agree to negotiate normalisation on the basis of equality and rationality. This is unlikely until Modi and the BJP have passed from power. Pakistan has lived with Indian hostility for 68 years. While war must be avoided through deterrence and diplomacy, Pakistan can wait a while longer to establish a normal relationship with India.